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ON SILENCING AND SLICING: PRESUMED CONSENT TO
POST-MORTEM ORGAN "DONATION" IN DIVERSIFIED
SOCIETIES
Marie-AndrgeJacobt
I. INTRODUCTION

Organ donation and transplantation is the site of a powerful
convergence of professional and patient interests. The professionals
are keen to apply new technologies, particularly ones that have

dramatic effects and even a "magical" character.! Patients are
interested in prolonging life, and in the ambiguous, yet enticing
promise of improving its quality.
But post-mortem organ
procurement often runs the risk of disturbing the human sensibility
in respect to our relations with our bodies, with death, and with
mourning.
Although the original narratives of organ donation, with their
connotations of gift giving, still resonate today in people's minds, in
donors' minds, the current, more practical goal of organ procurement
systems is the public need to solve the shortage of organs: to ensure
that the supply meets the demand. In this complex mix of ambition,
hope, and ruthless calculation, it is ethically and legally difficult to
control the development of organ donation.
In the general area of health care and research, which includes
organ and tissue removal, health professionals must obtain the

' LL.B. Universit6 Laval; LL.M. York University, J.S.D. in progress, Cornell
University; Research Associate, Gertner Institute for Epidemiology and Health Policy
Research. This paper arises from my LL.M. work, under the supervision of Roxanne
Mykitiuk. I thank her, as well as Lesley Jacobs, Tsachi Keren-Paz, Louise Langevin,
Mary Jane Mossman, and Lorne Sossin for their helpful comments. I also thank
Felicia Zeidman for her editorial assistance.
1. See NORA MACHADO, USING THE BODIES OF THE DEAD: LEGAL, ETHICAL AND
ORGANISATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION (1998).
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threshold of informed consent of the patient or subject.2 However, the
suggestion has been made that societies that practice organ
organ
transplantation could legally presume the consent of potential
S 3
suppliers, unless the supplier rebuts the presumption. This paper
addresses the issue of presumed consent as an organ procurement
strategy and examines whether it is an ethically sound policy for
diversified societies.
The exploration of the ethical foundations of the doctrine of
presumed consent is briefly presented, as well as examples of its legal
implementation. Part II presents deliberative ethics on the issue.
Part II also presents a sensitive approach to cultural difference. Both
approaches consequently inform the analysis and critique of
presumptions of consent to post-mortem organ donation in Part III.
Part III tackles the problems with presumptions of consent. Using A.
John Simmons' account of consent theory, presumed consent is probed
for its association with tacit consent and consent by inference. From
there, using the theoretical approaches presented in Part II, Part III
queries the realistic possibility that a society can presume tacit
deliberate undertakings. Additionally, Part III examines the concrete
implementation of presumed consent and the mechanisms proposed to
reverse the presumptions. Part IV complicates the issue, as most of
the criticisms against presumed consent hold up just as well against
an informed consent scheme: default rules present problems as they
come up against delicate matters deserving considered decisions by
each individual. The article ends by suggesting that if there is no
"best default rule" in this area, there could still be one of "lesser evil."
This paper does not deal directly with the issue of the allocation
of transplantable organs. In the context of organ donation and
transplantation, while procurement is the process of obtaining organs,

2. In Canada's common law jurisdictions, for example, this threshold has three
requirements: first, the patient has to be informed about the procedure to be
performed; second, she must be informed of possible consequences of the procedure;
and third, health professionals must inform the patient of any alternative treatment.
Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880; Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119.
When the procedure to be performed is research-oriented rather than therapeutic, the
threshold is higher still. Subjects must have comprehensive and honest disclosure of
all facts (i.e. probabilities and opinions that a reasonable person should have in order
to consider being a research subject). Furthermore, the benefits of the procedure
must outweigh its risks. Halushka v. Univ. of Saskatchewan, [1965] 53 D.L.R. (2d)
436.

3. See Jesse Durkeminier Jr., Supplying Organs for Transplantation,68 MICH. L.
REV. 811 (1969).
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alocation4 refers to the process of, and criteria for, determining who
should receive the donated organs. Allocation has been demonstrated
to favor privileged members of society In my view, the demand for
organs and an equitable allocation system can be assumed. Working
from this premise, this article is only concerned with organ
procurement. However, when distributive concerns are raised with
respect to organ procurement, the procurement patterns must be
evaluated against allocation patterns. Thus, the latter will be briefly
addressed when appropriate.
II. PRESUMED CONSENT THEORY
The literature of presumed consent has introduced the terms
"contracting-out" (or "opting-out") in relation to organ procurement.
In a "contracting-out" system, "organs may be removed after death
unless individuals positively indicate during their lifetimes that they
did not wish this to be done .

. . ."6

Everyone is automatically

considered a donor after death, unless they have affirmatively
withdrawn themselves from the pool of donors.' In this system, the
rule and routine is donation.
A. Ethical Grounds
Presumed consent can be justified by a communitarian vision of
the world. Communitarianism rejects a liberal construction of the

4. Allocation relates to the efficacy and benefits of transplantation, but also raises

diverse issues, including those related to resource allocation and management in
general. In this paper, I will not discuss the benefits of organ transplant in relation to
extending an individual's life or providing good quality of life. Issues of allocation of
scarce medical resources and of health services management are also beyond the

scope of this article. I must also state that the purpose of my research here was not
to analyze issues pertaining to recipients and specific categories of recipients based
on age, gender, ethnicity, geographic area, economic status and health status.
5. Michelle Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ Taking,
Racial Profiling & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2001); see also DAVID
PRICE,

LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION

(2002); Alasdair

MacLean, Organ Donation, Racism, and the Race Relations Act, 149 NEW L.J. 1250
(1999).
6. I. Kennedy et al., The Case for "PresumedConsent" in Organ Donation, 351 THE
LANCET 1650 (1998), available at 1998 WL 14104066.
7. In other words, to "opt-out" to the appropriate body (i.e. a computer registry, a

box to check on driver's license, or a note in hospital files).
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individual as an "unencumbered self."' Communitarianism focuses on
the interconnection, interdependence, and community-orientation of
beings. Following the Aristotelian tradition, Communitarian theory
suggests that ethics is "the exercise of a set of spatially and
temporally bound virtues that we may regard as our primary defense
system against the destruction or erosion of that human community
without which our lives would be aimless."9
According to a
communitarian, her organs might well belong to her during her life, as
they are essential in that lifetime; but when no longer needed by or
useful to her they are properly shared with the other community
members. This "sharing of the goods" ° is required, according to
Aristotle. "[T]o be [human] is to fill a set of roles each of which has its
own point and purpose: member of a family, citizen, soldier,
philosopher, servant of God."1 To this list, "organ supplier for your
sick fellows" can be added. Sharing is a higher value than an
individual's wish to preserve the integrity of a dead body.
Communitarians would approve of an across-the-board presumed
consent rule because the donation of organs would be the norm. As
reported by Nora Machado, "[niot to donate is a negative deviation
from the norm. Since the norm is viewed as a positive act, the
deviation becomes a negative and egoistic act," 2 thus fulfilling the
educational purpose of the law. Moreover, in order to effect the
deviation, steps must be taken; contrasted with the passive obedience
of the moral norm. Is it possible that a law or policy presuming
consent will facilitate altruistic behavior, as it becomes easy to donate
organs?
There are practical advantages to this method. If more organs
are desirable, people are more likely to passively concur (the "status
quo bias") and obey established routine. Without presumed consent,
they must perform an active, and to some extent, energy-consuming
altruistic act. In a world of presumed consent, "[i]nstead of altruism,

8. See M. G. KUCZEWSKI, FRAGMENTATION AND CONSENSUS: COMMUNITARIAN AND
CASUIST BIOETHICS (1997); see also ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); see also E. J. EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE:
MEDICAL ETHICS IN A LIBERAL POLITY (1991); see also E.H. LoEwy, MORAL STRANGERS,
MORAL ACQUAINTANCE, MORAL FRIENDS: CONNECTEDNESS AND ITS CONDITIONS (1997);
see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
9. ROSEMARIE TONG, ETHICS IN POLICY ANALYSIS 86-87 (1986); see also MCINTYRE,
supra note 8.
10. See KUCZEWSKI, supra note 8.
11. MCINTYRE, supra note 8, at 59.
12. MACHADO, supra note 1, at 193.
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one articulates a notion of quasi-civic duty in donating organs,
grounded on notions of social solidarity in society," writes Machado. 13
Another author speaks about presumed consent as being an
expression of "presumed solidarity.' ' The assumption is that current
human ethical behavior of lower priority between individual selfdevelopment and solidarity, or freedom and responsible involvement.
As such, building a presumption of solidarity into the law would be
ethically justifiable."
On the other hand, presumed consent could alter the very
meaning of the act of donating organs. What used to be an altruistic
act could become routine. Another label for presumed consent is, in
fact, "routine salvaging." Organ procurement could lose its solidarity
component, since it would have no "donation" ethos. Since presumed
consent bets on passivity, it may be unlikely to actually encourage
active altruism. Some would say this is better than nothing, and that
minor increases of altruism on the passive level helps people to help
others, which is good. Yet there is a philosophical breakdown in the
theory. One of presumed consent's underlying rationales is that it is
easier to have people do nothing, rather than have them take any
positive step to reverse the presumption by registering a refusal to
donate. Yet betting on passivity is qualitatively different from
presuming consent. 16 The ease of smoothly targeting inactive or
uninformed citizens as potential donors has disturbing qualities: "[i]f
one allows the existence of situations which easily generate donors, an
illegitimate aspect of organ removal by presumed consent arises.""
The inherent desire to do things rapidly and efficiently, and the
possible manipulation of donors, is ethically troublesome, as
elaborated below.
However, Maxwell Mehlman writes that presumed consent
arguably "allows people to fulfill their altruistic will by refraining
from objecting, which is psychologically easier for them than having to

13. Id. See also Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the Good Samaritan,97 MICH. L. REV.

1152 (1999).
14. P. Schotmans, Responsible Involvement on a Large Scale: The Gift of Life in
Implicit Solidarity, in ORGAN REPLACEMENT THERAPY: ETHICS, JUSTICE AND COMMERCE
(W. Land & J. Dossetor eds., 1991) [hereinafter ORGAN REPLACEMENT THERAPY].
15. Id.

16. A. Mendes & H. Alves, Organ Donation by Presumed Consent: Consequences and
Duties to the Society That Legalizes It, in ORGAN REPLACEMENT THERAPY, supra note
14, at 281.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
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give their express consent."' He bases this conclusion on the fact that
people "really want to donate their organs, or those of their loved
ones, but for psychological reasons cannot bring themselves to do so."' 9
Presumed consent, "[by eliminating the need to confront donation
actively in order to donate," ° would help solve this uneasy and
unfortunate situation, and would finally "allow individuals to give
effect to their true beliefs." 21 The routine arrangement of presumed

consent is considered useful in light of the argument that "there is a
repulsive feeling about donating one's organs. 2 2 People might find it
difficult to agree to donate their organs for a number of reasons,
including the "unimaginable condition of death" and the metaphysical
"conviction of our immortality. 2 3 The argument is that because fear,
taboo, and superstition surround death and bodily alteration of
cadavers, we should avoid asking the disconcerting question of
donation. Organ retrieval could then occur in a more efficacious way,
without confronting the psychological blocks of individuals. It is also
argued that 24a policy of presumed consent would erode this particular
social taboo.

Several things can be said at this point. First, calling certain
beliefs about death "taboo and superstition" can be an act of contempt.
It associates belief with an irrational, dark, and deviant universe.
Some beliefs about death will not be easy to grasp for anyone
irreligious or secular, be they nurses, physicians, bioethicists or

18. Maxwell J. Mehiman, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: A Reevaluation, 1
HEALTH MATRIX 31, 46 (1991).

19. Id. Melhman cites the works of Theodore Silver, who writes "[that seventy-five
percent of the populace should say 'yea' to organ donation from an armchair, while
eighty-three percent say 'nay' from the deathbed, suggests that most people believe
they should donate their organs but cannot bring themselves to do so." Theodore
Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft
Act, 68 B.U. L. REv. 681, 697 (1988).
20. Melhman, supra note 18, at 44; see also L.G. Futterman, Presumed Consent: The
Solution to the CriticalDonor Shortage?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE
CURRENT DEBATE 161 (A. Caplan & D.H. Coelho eds., 1998).
21. Mehlman, supra note 18, at 44.
22. Donald R. McNeil, The Constitutionality of "Presumed Consent" for Organ
Donation, 9 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 343 (1988-89).
23. Id. at 359 (quoting Sigmund Freud, Our Attitudes Towards Death, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 304 (1925)). In a piece written in 1970, Jess Durkeminier, one of the
initiators of presumed consent theory, argued that most people are unlikely to think
seriously about their own death to prompt them to take even the easiest action, like
making their wishes clear regarding organ donation. See Durkeminier, supra note 3.
24. McNeil, supra note 22, at 360.
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lawyers. While there are taboos and superstitions about death, not all
beliefs are so reducible. In fact, investigations of belief systems about
death, and whether avoiding the taboos is more appropriate than
facing them, are not addressed anywhere by proponents of the
campaign to erode social taboos.' 5 In addition, the assumption that
many people want to donate, but are incapable of making their wishes
come true is also colored by a dubious paternalism. It implies that in
the area of organ procurement, some potential suppliers cannot
assure their own well being, and that it is better to act on their behalf
precisely by presuming their consent. The idea of "protecting people
from themselves" by not disturbing them with serious issues colonizes
behaviors with a paternalistic approach. Again, those arguing in
favor of presumed consent do not discuss this problem.
Leaving aside the arguable issue of psychological barriers to
organ donation, there are external elements that could prevent
donation. Would-be donors may face social or religious pressure
preventing donations. In this situation, paternalism may be useful.
Presumed consent, as a default rule, might assist these individuals in
the realization of their wishes despite external pressure. 2 i
Nevertheless, there is a general sense of unease towards
paternalism in current bioethical literature, especially in the feminist
bioethical theory.27
History teaches that both paternalism and
beneficence, or paternalism alone, have been selectively applied
towards historically oppressed groups like women, disabled people,
ethnic minorities and the poor. Medical and political establishments
often perceived these groups as inherently vulnerable and in need of
special protection or even admonishment in order to properly look out
for themselves. The relationship between presumed consent for
donating organs and paternalism has a particular character.
Presumed consent is portrayed as a practice based on beneficence,

25. Since the 1970s, as exemplified in the lives of women like Karen Quinlan in the

Unites States, Nancy B. and Sue Rodriguez in Canada, and the writing of Elizabeth
Kubler-Ross, society's attitude towards death and dying may have changed enough so
that today, people can actually think about the eventuality of death and also about
organ donation. Therefore, this argument may be somewhat out-of-date.
26. These cases relate, among other things, to issues of internal minorities, which

will be elaborated on later.
27. See SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE

(1992); see also LAURA M. PURDY, REPRODUCING PERSONS: ISSUES IN FEMINIST
BIOETHICS (1996); see also Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, in
FEMINISM & BIOETHICS. BEYOND REPRODUCTION (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996) [hereinafter
FEMINISM

& BIOETHICS].
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which avoids the harm of asking people to make hard choices. Yet
this point is fraught with the belief that individuals, especially in
grieving families, are too fragile to deal with important, controversial
and delicate matters. Perhaps a young and poor Aboriginal man can
be spared the tough issues? And this unemployed, intoxicated
hysterical white woman: why harass her with this dilemma when she
is already so stressed?
These images capture the paternalism of presumed consent
theory. Presumed consent rationalizes and justifies paternalism on
the basis of beneficence towards those who should give organs.
Applying the beneficence argument to those who fear death requires
presumptions that are similarly fraught with paternalistic and
contemptuous problems.
B. Implementing PresumedConsent
Presumed consent policy was first suggested by Jess Durkeminier
and David Sanders in an issue of the New England Journal of
Medicine at a time when transplantation techniques were being
developed."' The authors suggested a shift from the classical standard
of informed consent: their proposal required that in post-mortem
organ donation, consent be the default. The objection to consent, that
is, the refusal to donate, would be the element that had to be
positively demonstrated. 9 Presumed consent is at the very least a
transformation of the method of soliciting organ donations. The
theory can also be understood as a radical reversal of the narrative of
organ transplantation which is based on will, desire, or at least
consent, to donate one's organs. Instead of asking "do you want to
give your organs after death?" and expressing that "we strongly
encourage you to donate your organs after death," the discourse shifts.
Now it is "we will take your organs, unless you intervene to prevent
us from doing so." Durkeminier and Sanders were pioneers in this
area and expressed very clearly the systematic reversal of language
that would take place under a presumed consent policy. They took a
rationalist's approach, and seemed to believe that modifying people's
actions and thought processes were a mechanical procedure. A reader

28. See Jesse Durkeminier & David Sanders Jr., Organ Transplantation:A Proposal
for Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 NEw ENG. J. MED. 413 (1968); see also
Durkeminier, supra note 3.
29. See Durkeminier, supra note 3; see also W.N. Gerson, Refining the Law of Organ
Donation: Lessons from the French Law of Presumed Consent, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1013 (1987).
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cannot help but envision operating machines, or playing with
numbers:
At present the surgeon is told: 'You may not remove cadaver organs
to save the life of a living person unless you have obtained consent
from the deceased or his next of kin.' He ought to be told: 'You may
remove cadaver organs to save the life of a living person unless the
deceased notified you that he objected or the next of kin objects.'3 °
But the method of Durkeminier and Sanders may backfire. It has
been argued that the resulting dissonance between the powerful "gift
narrative" of old and the rational policy of "implicit mandatory
supply" generated by presumed consent may paralyze the individual.
The result could be that the individual will not donate organs. 31
The implementation of presumed consent legislation has been
uneven. It is acknowledged that there are several types of presumed
consent laws, differing in their regulation of how "presumption" is
made. The laws also differ in their approach to the wishes of the
deceased's family.
Presumed consent legislation provisions from Austria, Brazil,
France, and the United States illustrate the diversity of presumed
consent legislation. These four jurisdictions provide examples from a
strict approach to presumed consent to a presumption that leaves
room for objections. Presumed consent in one jurisdiction includes
donation of all solid organs, while in another jurisdiction, presumed
consent is for the donation of eye corneas solely.
1. Austria
Austria has a "strict" presumed consent system. Austria's
Hospital Law states that "[i]t shall be permissible to remove
organs..,

from

deceased

persons 3

2

for

the

purpose

of

transplantation, and that "[sluch removal shall be prohibited if the
physicians are in possession of a declaration in which the deceased
person, or prior to his death, his legal representative, has expressly
refused his consent to organ donation."" In order to avoid the

30. See Daniel J. Crothers & Catherine G. Uglem, A Proposal for a Presumed
Consent Organ DonationPolicy in North Dakota, 68 N.D. L. REV. 637 n.74 (1992).
31. See D.K. Martin & E. Meslin, The Give and Take in Organ Procurement, 19 J.
MED. & PHlL. 61 (1994).
32. Federal Law of 1 June 1982 (Serial No. 273), ch. 7, § 62a (1), amended to the
Hospital Law, No. 113, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 132 (1994)

33. Id.

[hereinafter

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES].
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retrieval of organs, the individual not only has to indicate his or her
refusal, but this refusal has to be in the physician's possession at the
Determining consent for post-mortem organ
relevant hour.
transplantation takes place in stressful circumstances, often, in an
emergency setting. It is possible that the consent document will not
be in the physician's possession, but rather, with the family, or at the
site of the deady accident. In cases like car accidents, gunshots, etc.,
the consent or refusal of the donor might as well be in the coroner's
possession. Under these circumstances, Austrian law does not require
the physician to seek out a document that would indicate a refusal to
donate. Moreover, the legislation does not give the family of the
deceased a say in the donation question.
2. Brazil
Brazil had a short-lived "strict" presumed consent policy. From
1997 to 1998, the Presumed Organ Donor Law34 mandated that
"[u]nless manifestation of will to the contrary, in the scope of this
Law, it is presumed that authorization is given for the donation of
tissues, organs and human body parts, for the purpose of
transplantation of treatment of diseases."6 To be excluded from the
pool of donors, the person had to have the expression "non-donor of
organs and tissues" engraved in an indelible and inviolable manner on
her identification document or driving license. 6 Due to a major public
outcry and serious criticism from the part of medical associations, the
legislation was abolished a year after its enactment.
3. France
The relevant provision of the French Loi de Cavaillet (1976) reads
simply: "Organs may be removed for therapeutic or scientific purposes
from cadavers of persons who have not, during their lifetime,
indicated their refusal to permit such a procedure. ' 5 The second

34. Decreto No. 9.434, de 4 de fevereiro de 1997, D.O.U de 1997 (repealed 1998). See
Everton Bailey, Should the State Have Rights to Your Organs? Dissecting Brazil's
Mandatory Organ Donation Law, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 707 (1999) (For a
commentary of the legislative history of the Presumed Organ Donor Law).
35. Decreto No. 9.434, supra note 34, art. 4.
36. Bailey, supra note 34, at 726 n.2 (quoting Decreto No. 9.434, ch. II, art. 4, § 1).
37. Claudio Csillag, Brazil Abolishes "Presumed Consent" in Organ Donation, 352
THE LANCET 1367 (1998), available at 1998 WL 14105861.
38. Law No. 76-1181 of December 22, 1976, on the removal of organs, § 2, reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES, supra note 32, at 200; see also J. Y. Nau, Chaque Fran~ais

pourra refuser d~s 1996 le don post-mortem, LE MONDE, 20 June 1995.
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paragraph of the provision makes an exception for the cadaver of a
minor or of an incompetent individual, in which case the organs may
be removed only with the authorization of the individual's legal
representative. It is evident by reading this exception for minors and
incompetent persons that dissent from the deceased's family members
have no impact in regular circumstances. However, in practice,
France does have a 'soft' presumed consent system because health
care providers do not follow the presumed consent law and protocols.39
The majority of providers have tended to stay loyal to informed
consent standards in respect to the policies and practice of postmortem organ donation; since the enactment of the presumed consent
law, their practice has changed only slightly. Interestingly, the
health care provider did not assume or presume consent, but would
search for objections to consent. In terms of time and energy, the
search for evidence that the individual did not consent is in effect, a
search for consent. The standards and the actions of the medics are
4
the same; the only exception being that what is sought is refusal 0
instead of agreement41 to organ donation. The reason the system
"shifted the focus from seeking consent to seeking objections" 42 was to
allay doctors' fears43 of taking organs when there might be an
objection (whether from the deceased herself or from her next-of-kin)
of which they were unaware. 4 This feature, specific to the medical
context in France, softens their presumed consent rule.
4. United States of America
Statutes dealing with presumed consent in the United States
attempt to overcome the notion of "consent as a barrier problem.""'
Thus, an underlying philosophy of the statutes is that consent is a

39. See Gerson, supra note 29.
40. Or absence of consent.
41. Or consent.
42. M.O.R.E. PROGRAM OF ONTARIO, ORGAN PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES. A REVIEW OF

ETHICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 22 (1994) [hereinafter M.O.R.E. REPORT].

43. It may be the fear of hurting a mourning family, the fear of being stigmatized by
the medical or social opinion, the fear of doing something morally wrong, or the fear

of facing a lawsuit. Empirical support and practical justifications for these fears will
be provided later in this section.
44. P. DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE HEALTH CARE LAW 558 (2001).

45. Karen Clarke, The Washington Hospital Center Example: A Hospital's Guide to
Implementing the Rapid Organ Recovery Program, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
501, 510 (2000); see Goodwin, supra note 5.
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46

problematic obstacle to progress. American presumed consent laws
vary greatly, operating at both a strict in some jurisdictions and a
softer level in others. Called "legislative consent," the strict version
was first enacted in the state of Maryland.
Subsequently, twentyeight states have passed presumed consent laws, 48 though presumed
consent is currently practiced in only nine states. 49 Legislative
consent provisions are included in the regulatory framework of
medical autopsies, and target specific parts of the body, such as the
cornea or pituitary glands. 5' As of July 2002, the Maryland Estates
and Trusts Code allows the medical examiner to remove organs if
"En]o objection by the next of kin is known by the medical examiner"
and if "[n]o religious objection made by the decedent before death is
46. Erik S. Jaffe, Note, She's Got Bette Dauis['sI Eyes: Assessing The Nonconsensual
Removal of Cadaver Organs under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 528 (1990).
47. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRusTs § 4.509.1 (1998) reads in relevant part:
(a) In any case where a patient is in need of corneal tissue for a
transplant, the Chief Medical Examiner, the deputy chief medical
examiner, or an assistant medical examiner shall provide the
cornea upon the request of the Medical Eye Bank of Maryland,
Incorporated, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this
section, and under the following conditions:
(1) The medical examiner has charge of a decedent who may
provide a suitable cornea for transplant or research;
(2) An autopsy will be required;
(3) No objection by the next of kin is known by the medical
examiner;
(4) No religious objection made by the decedent before death
is known by the medical examiner; and
(5) Removal of the cornea for transplant will not interfere
with the subsequent course of an investigation or
autopsy or alter the post-mortem facial appearance.
(c) [Liability of Medical Examiner] The Chief Medical Examiner, the
deputy chief medical examiner, an assistant medical examiner,
the Medical Eye Bank of Maryland, Incorporated, or the Lions of
District 22-C Eye Bank and Research Foundation, Incorporated,
are not liable for civil action if the next of kin subsequently
contends that authorization of that kin was required.
Id.
48. See Goodwin, supra note 5, at n.78 (for a list of states where the legislative
consent provision was implemented).
49. Id. at 26.
These are California, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. Id. at n.79.
50. Id.
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known by the medical examiner."5 ' The restriction for an objection
based on religion is an interesting feature of the Code. Another
requirement is that the objection has "to be known" by the medical
examiner although the Code does not require that the medical
examiner investigate for notice of objection.
The softer version of presumed consent in the American
legislation is found in the 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (the Act).
Here, presumed consent can be determined by way of "reasonable
effort." The Act is a model, available for adoption by states. It creates
statutory removal for purposes of transplantation only. A medical
examiner (or other authorized person in conformity with the Act) is
authorized to remove body parts from the deceased after the medic
has exercised a "reasonable effort" to locate a refusal or contrary
indication by the decedent, and to obtain consent from the next of kin
52
The duty for the medical
to post-mortem organ procurement.
examiner to make a reasonable effort rises and falls in accordance
with the "useful life of the part"5 to be removed.
Controversial applications of American presumed consent laws
include pre-consent perfusion, which consists in injecting a cold
preserving fluid into the patient's organs (abdominal cavity and
kidneys) to avoid the deterioration of organs, without first attempting
to locate consent from next of kin. 4
The above demonstrates a number of problems pertaining to the
application of presumed consent legislation in several jurisdictions.
Whether the absence of objection to procure organs is even relevant,
whether it has to be self-evident, or whether it has to be sought,
looked at, or profoundly searched for by health care providers until an
actual objection arises, is unclear in some jurisdictions. Second, there
is no consensus respecting whose silence is relevant: the patient, the
next-of-kin, or both.5 Finally, the fact that some presumed consent

51. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4.509.1(a)(3)(4) (1998).
52. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT ACT § 4 (National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws 1987).

53. Id. at § 4, cmt.
54. Mark Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation:From Where Will New
Donors Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 310
n.69 (1995); CRUZ, supra note 44, at 581.

55. The issue of family veto over an individual decision over post-mortem organ
procurement is beyond the scope of this paper. I discuss it in Marie-Andree Jacob,
Consent, Conversation, and the Regulation of Post-mortem Organ Procurement in a

Multicultural Canada(unpublished LL.M. thesis) (on file with author).
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laws also acknowledge the validity of informed consent to organ
donation adds to the confusion.
It has been noted that often doctors fail to observe presumed
consent laws.5 6 Many of them might simply not know the law. Others
might be motivated by fears of legal liability or by concern for the
grieving family. Additionally, why do medics contravene these laws?
It appears that sometimes, a health care provider does not act in
accordance with a presumed consent scheme. Not following the
scheme derives the following benefits: the burden of asking for
consent is avoided per se (this is an efficient advantage); the life of
another patient could be saved following a doctor's rapid,
unchallenged action with the body of a recently deceased person
unable to object to donation; and in some cases, these efficiencyoriented presumptions of consent receive legal endorsement. The
reluctance of doctors to follow presumed consent practices, in spite of
these advantages, reveals some doctors' commitment to the threshold
of informed consent by donors (surely there is an influence of the law
as well). The de facto, and often purposeful, non-compliance on the
part of health care providers reveals at the very least a serious flaw in
the application of presumed consent laws.
C. Efficient Implementation and the Need for Assessment
Despite the critiques, a presumed consent policy should be
considered. The question arises of whether efficient and sustainable
applications of presumed consent, if unchallenged in courts, ground
presumed consent as an ethically sound health policy. It appears that
when presumed consent is applied strictly and consistently, it can
"work"; that is, the result can be a substantive increase in the
available amount of transplantable organs, but at what social cost."'
Issues about efficiency and utilitarianism enter the bioethical
analysis. If presumed consent increases rates of donation and saves
lives, is it sufficiently successful to override other ethical
considerations?
Furthermore, assuming it would not cause
controversy in the population and front-page stories in the media, and
would not be challenged in court by litigants, could it justify its
admission as a public health policy?

56. Interview with Jacquie Lang, Transplant Coordinator at the Trillium Gift of Life
Network (formerly M.O.R.E. Program of Ontario, and then Organ Donation Ontario)
(Feb. 14, 1999 and Nov. 16, 1999); see also M.O.R.E. REPORT, supra note 42.
57. See Lang, supra note 56.
58. See Goodwin, supra note 5.
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It is awkward to challenge a policy that attempts to save lives
and increase quality of life. The protection of life is an overarching
priority in most societies. It follows that the increase of the supply of
transplantable organs might be the most urgent factor for
consideration in the creation of a good organ procurement policy. The
problem is that the protection of lives, and of quality of life, can
hardly be pursued ethically if it is pursued without regard for social
oppression and disempowerment. Therefore, policies of procurement
ought to acknowledge that the supply of organs is not the only issue to
consider. Other considerations include: how to obtain the supply; the
source of the supply; and to whom will the supply be directed; and
whose lives and quality of life will be improved. These are issues that
an organ procurement policy must take into consideration.
For example, since the purpose of presumed consent policy is to
encourage the communitarian principle of sharing of social goods,
organs, amongst all,5" based on their needs, the policy must truly
benefit all. Furthermore, if we are to enact a policy of presumed
consent to encourage altruism on the basis that we should all
contribute to the social contract, as full members of the contract, then
contributions must be made in fairness for all members. It would be
unacceptable if certain members contributed over-proportionally,
without benefiting from the contract. In this respect, historical and
contemporary inequalities between the participants of the social
contract should be considered6.
Alongside procurement matters, issues of allocation of donated
organs will arise when contemplating fairness. These issues are
beyond the focus of this paper. Rather, this article considers whether
presumed consent, as a strategy of increasing the supply of
transplantable organs, imposes the onus of the enterprise
59. Obviously, "all" is said normatively. Canada, for example, has in fact made a
commitment to provide medical services for all, through a predominantly publicly
financed, privately delivered health care system known to Canadians as "Medicare."
The system aims to be universal and comprehensive. Canada Health Act, R.S.C., ch.
C-6, §§ 9-10 (1985) (Can.).
60. See Goodwin, supra note 5. Carole Pateman wrote about the fallacious nature of
the social contract, in which supposedly, all members participate by giving up and
benefiting equally, and on how such a social contract is based on a brotherhood
hermetic to women's participation as full members of the contract. See CAROLE
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988). A "racial contract," by denying personhood
to certain men and by restricting its terms to whites only, is also a reality that has
little to do with the liberal idea of the social contract. See CHARLES W. MILLS, THE
RAcIL CONTRACT (1997); see also Anthony Farley, The Black Body as A Fetish Object,
76 OR. L. REV. 457 (1997).
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disproportionately on the most fragile members of society.
Nevertheless, if this enterprise is assessed with an equality paradigm,
the issue of procurement cannot be fully disconnected from allocation
problems.
In unequal societies, it is likely the organ shortage will be borne
by the disadvantaged, and the available supply will be channeled
towards the advantaged. Therefore, an overall increase in the supply
of organs might benefit the less privileged members of society in the
end by easing the pressure specifically placed on their community.
The test would be whether there are benefits to the underprivileged in
allocation, when weighed against the procurement statistics of this
socioeconomic stratum. Organ transplantation is a sophisticated and
expensive procedure, and its performance involves many costs for the
recipients, even those in a public universal health system; many of
the related costs will remain uncovered by private or governmentsponsored health plans (e.g. anti-rejection medications). These factors
might limit access to organ transplantation for the poor and minority
groups.
The primary focus of this paper is an assessment of the
implications of presumed consent as a procurement strategy. Since
procurement takes place in the general context of social inequality,
the issue of procurement can also be assessed on its own, that is,
without the reference to allocation. Two theories of guidance in this
inquiry include: deliberative ethics and its constructive criticism, and
sensitivity to cultural difference in health issues.
III. INPUTS FROM DELIBERATIVE ETHICS AND SENSITIVITY TO
CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

A. DeliberativeEthics Framework
If a presumed consent policy applied to post-mortem organ
This
removal, there might be a lack of voluntary responses.
phenomenon would disempower people, rendering them passive in the
face of social change. This is precisely what supporters of deliberative
ethics fear.
Proponents of deliberative ethics, including many feminists61 and
62
have focused on
political philosopher Jiirgen Habermas,
61. See Tong, supra note 27; see also Janet Farrell Smith, Communicative Ethics in
Medicine: The Physician-PatientRelationship, in FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS, supra note
27, at 184; Therese Murphy, Health Confidentiality in the Age of Talk, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH CARE LAW 155 (Sally Sheldon & Michael Thomson eds.,
1998).
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communication itself as an ethical framework. Participating in
ethical deliberations results in empowerment and self-affirmation.
An ethics of communication, also known as deliberative ethics,
asserts that awareness, reflection and response by individuals on
social issues are crucial. Its basic underlying premise is that when
agents face disagreements, discussion should take place until a
mutually acceptable resolution is found. Specifically in the legal
context, it is believed that deliberative ethics should be mobilized
through connection between the participation in the discussion (in
making the law) and a correlative personal involvement (in following
the law). In other words, because they contribute in establishing
what the law will be, citizens will comply with it afterward.
Communication, here, is not simply a procedural step towards a
specific goal, but a ground from which ethical values can emerge.
Human speech is a form of action per se, which allows for exploration
of new norms and policies. Deliberations, discussions and critique
become the sources and essential components of the validation of
principles.
Eventually, from the better reasoned and better
articulated arguments, admitted ethical principles will emerge.
This ethical process, however, does not necessarily lead to
consensus or agreement. But if no consensus is achieved, then what is
the point of a deliberative ethics? Will it keep citizens paralyzed by
other's standpoints and oppositions, or chaotically trying to convince
one another? For instance, with respect to consent to post-mortem
organ removal, it is possible that policy-makers, lawyers, donors,
donor families, recipients, their families, nurses, physicians and
hospital coordinators may never reach a workable consensus. For this
situation Janet Farrell Smith establishes a distinction between
consensus and "mutual understanding":
Rather than discussion aimed at persuasion, pressure, or
manipulation of the hearer to achieve the speaker's ends, the goal is
mutual comprehension and reasonable assessment.
The
fundamental ethical points lie in two subjects reaching reciprocal
62. See JURGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY,
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987); see also DAVID M. RASMUSSEN, READING HABERMAS
(1990); see also STEPHEN K. WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OF JURGEN HABERMAS: REASON,
JUSTICE, AND MODERNITY (1988).

63. See Robert J. Lukens, Discoursing on Democracy & the Law - A Deconstructive
Analysis, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 587 (1997); see also Bjarne Melkevik, Transformation du
droit: le point de vue du module communicationnel,in Aux FRONTIERES DU JURIDIQUE :
ETUDES INTERDISCIPLINAIRES SUR LES TRANSFORMATIONS DU DROIT (Jean-Guy Belley &
Pierre Issalys eds., 1993).
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understanding while holding full respect for each other's reasoning
process, reasons, feelings, and authentic noncoerced participation."
Yet, query whether all citizens are equal, uncoerced
participants in public forums and private discussions. In a similar
manner, in the context of health care, are patients and their
physicians involved in a reciprocalexchange of information, reasoning
and doubting? In the specific context of organ retrieval, where certain
actors have technical knowledge, familiarity with very sophisticated
procedures, and more power than others, is a cooperative reciprocity
genuinely possible?
Consider further that Farrell Smith, building on Habermas,
raises the important distinction between a strategic transmission of
a cooperative
and
to listeners,
information by speakers
communicative action where both actors feed each other. Instead of
merely delivering knowledge, communicative action is a process of
interaction in which agents understand each other, and even, as
summed up '6by5 Rosemarie Tong, "conclude their unique stories
satisfactorily.
But the question as to how agents who are unequal can feed each
other mutually remains unsolved. Farrell Smith and Tong reject
Habermas' law of the "force of the better argument," which they find
to
an
equivalent
(something
of communication
reductive
argumentation to achieve consensus). Rather than a model aiming for
agreement, they prefer a model acknowledging differences that aims
to reduce and dissolve them into a mutual understanding. Their
model for interactive deliberation emphasizes identification with
others, but might obscure barriers. In fact, mutual understanding
implies pre-existing cognitive reciprocity. Genuine cooperative
communicative efforts imply mutual respect at the moral level. Yet
both are generally absent within systematically unequal relations
such as patient and health care provider relations; so agents in this
area can hardly reach satisfactory mutual arrangements and
understandings. Moreover, it is likely that in health care settings,

64. Smith, supra note 61, at 186.
65. See Tong, supra note 27, at 70. Tong's framework for bioethical decision-making
is conversationalism. Tong defines conversationalism as the belief that the ultimate
aim or function of bioethical decision making is "to reveal to people the moral content
and the consequences of their family traditions, psychological characteristics,
spiritual resources, socioeconomic status, personal experiences, and religious beliefs."

Id.
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social power difference prevents people from negotiating on an equal
foot to begin with.66
The asymmetry results not only from economical and political
inequalities, but also derives from a socially constructed, internalized
sense of having something to say, and from the valorization of certain
types or forms of expression over others. Deliberation is not neutral;
it is based on shared assumptions about speech itself. How to discuss,
what language to employ, and how to express disagreements can come
into play. For example, in scientific and medical settings, refused
consent by marginal patients such as poor women of color, is often
reduced to an individual opposition or self-defensiveness, an irrational
expression of anger, stubbornness, or selfishness. Consent is rarely
recognized as a legitimate site of power. It is rarely acknowledged, let
alone encouraged, as a worthwhile, distinct expression informed by
one's gender, class, race, or religion.
Generally, decisions to deviate from the norm, whether they be of
reasonable usages, unwritten rules, or default rules, will raise
suspicion.6 Thus, opting-out of presumed consent might be regarded
as unreasonable. The expression of dissent might also come with
other costs, for example, losing the little mutual trust and cooperation
remaining in a relationship with an institution or its representative
(the state, a hospital, a physician), or being pushed even further to
the margins.
In this arena, where communication is fraught with difficulties,
and where agreements or even mutual understandings might not
occur, there is little room for presumptions of consent. Rather, there is
room for listening. Yet, presumed consent laws are goal-oriented and
encourage silence as the mode of "participation" or "self-expression."
In the case of organ procurement, discussing consent to post-mortem
donation makes more sense than avoiding it. Asking for consent is
preferable to presuming it; and listening to its expression rather than
picturing it, is the only option for genuine communication. The real
possibility of genuine deliberation is still a long way ahead of us.
Nevertheless, this approach would be a bit closer to empowerment,
agency and responsibility, and could create a "discrete site of

66. IRIS MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, AND POLICY 63 (1997). See also Murphy, supra note 61.

67. See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1710 (1997).
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rebellion '68 against submission and silence in the area of post-mortem
organ procurement.
Two final things should be mentioned about deliberative ethics.
First, the shortage of organs has been construed as a crisis to be
solved through crisis management. Yet communicative action in
making bioethical choices is not counter-efficient per se to the goal of
increasing organ supply. Second, and more importantly, organ
procurement is not strictly a crisis to be solved. It is a social issue, an
"opportunity" for individuals to empower themselves and to become
responsible by making their own choices (to donate or not). This longterm goal should not be eliminated in order to satisfy urgent, but
short-term, public needs.
B. Input from a MulticulturalSensitivity
What is the place of cultural difference as a variable in health
policy assessment? How can adequate comment about groups and
communities be made, in particular about "ethnicity" and "culture" in
the context of health care? There are definite risks in using these
terms when constructing an argument. 9
By drawing attention to ethnic differences, one runs the risk of
problematising ethnicity rather than focusing on racism. ° Oppressive
or ambient racism can be obscured by an emphasis on culture,
ethnicity, and on their distinctive, "exotic" features. A second
concern over the careless usage of the words ethnicity and culture is
that they often oversimplify categories. Any categorization, even if
subtle, can never perfectly represent the reality of humankind."2 Most
importantly, ethnicity is not fixed: "Ethnicity is a shifting category
which can change over time, whether defined by individuals
68. I owe this terse and powerful expression to Khiara M. Bridges, from her piece
about the risks of further alienating Black Female America though the alienability of
aborted fetuses. Khiara M. Bridges, Note, On the Commodification of the Black
Female Body: The CriticalImplicationsof the Alienability of Fetal Tissue, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 123, 138 (2002).
69. See RESEARCHING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN HEALTH (David Kelleher & Sheila
Hillier eds., 1996) [hereinafter CULTURAL DIFFERENCES].
70. Id.; see also RACE AND HEALTH IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN (Waqar I. U. Ahmad
ed., 1993); see also Waqar I. U. Ahmad, The Trouble with Culture, in CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES, supra note 69, at 190; see also Avtar Brah, Difference, Diversity and
Differentiation,in RACE, CULTURE AND DIFFERENCE 126 (James Donald & Ali Rattansi
eds., 1992).
71. See Jenny Donovan, WE DON'T BUY SICKNESS. IT JUST COMES: HEALTH, ILLNESS
AND HEALTH CARE IN THE LIvES OF BLACK PEOPLE IN LONDON (1986).
72. Id. at 4.
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themselves or by others. Therefore, we must expect definitions to
the relevance of some categories to increase or
change and
73
disappear."

To quote Chetan Batt: "[slocial difference' is continually remade
and is a contingent, incomplete and aggregate process rather than a
pre-existing edifice."74 Batt also points out that differentiation is not
exterior to an already defined group identity that knows its content,
boundaries, and place in relation to other group identities. Instead,
differentiation is "radically interior and disruptive of those group
identities. Indeed, a primary function of identity is precisely to
and contain the differentiation which constantly threatens
manage
5
it.

7

Therefore, if a multicultural state considers the shared, culturally
specific values of minority groups, it should be careful not to construct
groups as homogeneous cells. Rather, it should recognize their intraGender, social class, age, religion, level of
ethnic difference. 76
education and area of origin in the home country (i.e. rural or urban)
These
mark critical differences within an immigrant group.
differences can disrupt anything so-called "characteristic" about the
group's identity. 77 However, the practice in health care settings does
not reflect this reality. Some members of minority groups experience
their contact with health professionals as "stereotyping," for example,
behaving towards them as if all East Indians are the same.78 Again,
there are also risks inherent in putting emphasis on "differences,"
because focusing on difference underscores the stigma of deviance. 79
Sherene Razack provides a fair account of the dangers of this type of
attitude towards cultural difference. She states that too often, the

73. Id.
74. Chetan Batt, New Foundations: Contingency, Indeterminacy and Black
Translocality,in, THE LESSER EVIL AND THE GREATER GOOD: THE THEORY AND POLITICS
OF SOCIAL DIvERSITY 138, 161 (Jeffrey Weeks ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE LESSER

EVIL].
75. Id.
76. Shasi Assanand et al., The South Asians, in CROSS-CULTURAL CARING: A
HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN WESTERN CANADA 246 (Nancy Waxler-

Morison et al. eds., 1990); Donald P. Irish et al., Conclusions to ETHNIC VARIATIONS IN
DYING, DEATH,AND GRIEF: DIVERSITY IN UNIVERSALITY 182 (Donald P. Irish et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter ETHNIC VARIATIONS].
77. Nancy Waxler-Morison, Introduction to ETHNIC VARIATIONS, supra note 76, at 8.
78. Id.

79. See Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, The Uses of
PoststructuralistTheory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUDIES 33 (1988).
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implementation of multicultural policies in different spheres of life
can turn into "politics of rescue" and into fantasizing about helping
out the exotic other. As a result, those who claim to assist oppressed
groups in fact perpetuate inequalities by speaking for them, outlining

superficially their features, beliefs, and behaviors, and do not offer
them a genuine, empowering voice.'o
Hence a celebration of
difference, if not accompanied with genuine recognition, further

marginalizes excluded and powerless groups."'
ignoring

difference

is even

more dangerous.

On the other hand,
In

the case

of

subordinated groups, it leaves in place a "faulty neutrality. '8 2 This is
the "difference dilemma," as presented by Martha Minow."
Acknowledging difference in health care bears a particular
importance. The history of medicine reveals that certain bodies have
repeatedly been de-valued and mistreated over the bodies of others.

This created "difference." Devaluation of the body occurred in the
context of scientific experiments or other motives fulfilling the public
health and the public good.
The eighteenth, nineteenth, and
twentieth centuries are replete with medical research that abused
people's bodies, especially those of women, Jews, and blacks.84 Bodies

80. SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE AND
CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS (1998). Razack argues:

What makes the cultural difference approach so inadequate in various
pedagogical moments is not so much that it is wrong, for people in reality
are diverse and do have culturally specific practices that must be taken
into account, but that its emphasis on cultural diversity too often descends,
in a multicultural spiral, to a superficial reading of differences that makes
power relations invisible and keeps dominant cultural norms in place.
Id. at9.
81. See Judith Squires, Orderingthe City: Public Spaces and Political Participation,
in THE LESSER EVIL, supra note 74, at 79.
82. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990).
83. Id. at 19.
84. See ANN G. DALLY, WOMEN UNDER THE KNIFE: A HISTORY OF SURGERY (1992);
Rebecca Dresser, What Bioethics can Learn from the Women's Health Movement, in
FEMINISM & BIOETHICS, supra note 27, at 144; see also Paul Starr, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); see also DAVID J. ROTHMAN,
STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED
MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991); see also Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research:
The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, in TUSKEGEE TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE
SYPHILIS STUDY 15 (Susan M. Reverby ed., 2000); see also Patricia A. King, Race,
Justice, and Research, in BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH 88 (Jeffery
P. Kahn et al. eds., 1998); see also Farley, supra note 60; see also Goodwin, supra note
5.
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of the poor and of people with disabilities have also been
enthusiastically subjected to research that consumed accessible,
interesting raw material. In the context of organ procurement policymaking, these historical inequalities must be taken into account.
They have a direct influence on the willingness of certain groups to
donate organs."
In health-related matters, an example of genuine recognition is to
admit that difference, in itself, can become a source of confronting
knowledge for policy-makers. For example, differences in religions
can provide novel grounds to test the conceptual claims, premises and
limits of knowledge. While admittedly a sign of cultural difference,
religion has been deliberately excluded in consideration of the
impetus behind people's ethics and vision of the good.86 Relegating
religion as a sign of cultural difference, or a mere symptom expressing
itself with rites, has unjustly superficialized the religious difference,
and is ignorant of religion's part in the life of the subject. Put fully,
religion is "a cultural instrument rather than a mark of cultural
difference. '8 7 It can be behind a person's ethics; it can also be a motor
of cultural production at the social level. Religion profoundly shapes
world-views and conceptions about health, quality of life, death, or
bodily integrity.
Religious discourse is a source of beliefs and values that can
ground people's support or refusal to donate one's organs after death.
Certain religious tenets focus on the sacredness of the body and the
preservation of life. Jewish law, for example, requires "that Jews take
steps to preserve their life and health, even when secular law and
medical practice might have determined death."8 As these beliefs
might inhibit some Jews to voluntarily participate in post-mortem

85. See Goodwin, supra note 5.
86. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Politics of Translation, in DESTABILIZING
THEORY: CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST DEBATES 177, 192 (Michele Barrett & Anne
Phillips eds., 1992).

87. Id. Further, according to Gayatri Spivak, religion might be an important key to
better understand marginal voices; since "given the connection between imperialism

and secularism, there is almost no way of getting to alternative general voices except
through religion." Id. See also Nancy Frankenberry, Philosophy of Religion in
Different Voices, in PHILOSOPHY IN A FEMINIST VOICE 173 (Janet A. Kourany ed., 1998).

88. Goodwin, supra note 5, at 33 (quoting Elliot N. Dorff, Choosing Life: Aspects of
Judaism Affecting Organ Transplantation, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS
AND REALITIES 168, 177 (Stuart J. Younger et al. eds., 1996)). See also D.W. Weiss,
Organ Transplantation, Medical Ethics, and Jewish Law, 20 TRANSPLANTATION
PROCEEDINGS 1071 (1988).
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organ procurement, a policy presuming their consent could offend the
religious observant members of this community.
Unfortunately, however, in the context of health care, "many
members of cultural minorities feel that health professionals do not
understand them and assume that they feel and believe just as
others... do."8 9 Further, health professionals who acknowledge
"cultural difference," may not go so far as to recognize the presence of
dissenting internal minorities within a culture. Efforts have to be
made in the law and policy of organ collection to recognize the
different choices with respect to cadaveric organ procurement made
by citizens from different ethno-cultural and religious backgrounds,
despite pressures for rapidity and ease of organ collection.
The heterogeneity of society requires attention. Institutions such
as hospitals have a responsibility to concern themselves with it. They
are more than just service providers. Canadian law has spoken about
such institutions and about their relation to the survival of
communities: "They are cultural milieus which provide individuals
with the means of expressing their cultural identity, and which by
extension permit them to reaffirm their cultural adherence to a
community."9 As mentioned earlier, the idea and empowerment of
choice and deliberation by potential organ donors is more ethically
sound than a policy of silence towards the question of organ donation.
This norm of choice is more significant when the decision-makers, in
this case, patients might be in deep disagreement with one another
because of their respective cultural or religious heritage. At issue are
the implications of the explicit recognition of diversity in organ
procurement.
In today's pluralistic societies, consensus is difficult to obtain.
Therefore, if obtained, suspicion is cast upon the actors in the socalled "consensual" result.91 Deliberative ethics and multiculturalism
are connected in the analysis that fosters this suspicion. The
disagreements, negotiations and passions that emerge from culturally
diverse groups about post-mortem organ procurement are important,
especially in contrast to the homogeneous vision of organ
transplantation shared in the medical community. It is interesting to
consider whether, in a culturally homogeneous country like Japan, for

89. ETHNIC VARIATIONS, supra note 76, at 8 (emphasis added).
90. Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de Restructuration des Services de Sante),
[1995] 181 D.L.R. (4th) 266, affd, 208 D.L.R. (4th) 577.
91. See Judith Squires, Ordering the City: Public Spaces and PoliticalParticipation,
in THE LESSER EVIL, supra note 74, at 79.
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example, presumed consent could be an ethically acceptable policy.
Later, this paper will elaborate on the factors that may render
presumed consent problematic even in so-called homogeneous
societies. Additionally, the issue of class, for example, is another
characteristic ignored by exclusionary practices, demonstrated infra,
but first, a discussion of deliberative ethics and its practice within the
framework of multiculturalism.
C. Linking Deliberationand Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is tightly bound to the concept of choice. A
certain vision of freedom of choice and of liberalism, based on a
commitment to personal autonomy, and also deeply grounded in 92a
concern with cultural membership, is elucidated by Will Kymlicka.
Kymlicka connects individual choices and culture not only because the
former is dependent on the latter, but more powerfully because the
making of choices influences cultural practices/societal practices, and
vice-versa. 93 For him, meaningful individual choice is possible only if
individuals deliberate, that is, have access to information and the
opportunity to reflectively evaluate, freely express, and exchange
thoughts. Individuals also need access to a societal culture. Groupdifferentiated measures, distinctive of multiculturalism, which secure
and promote this access, may have a legitimate role to play in a
liberal theory of justice.94 Kymlicka specifies that our societal culture
provides various options from which individuals can engage in
deliberation and make choices. More importantly, it makes these
options meaningful.9 5
Why don't the members of a minority culture simply integrate
into the majority societal culture, leaving behind their other culture to
decay and fade out? Kymlicka says that if integration is slow, the
original culture is retained to serve as the primary focus of
96
identification. This is because it is based on simple belonging, not
accomplishment. 97 Further, unity and consensus in the majority
societal culture cannot be forced or fabricated. To quote Judith
Squires:
92. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); see also C. TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALIsME: DIFFERENCE ET
DEMOCRATIE (A. Gutmann ed., D-A Canal trans., 1994).

93. See KYMLICKA, supra note 92.

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
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The urge to bring things into unity necessarily entails expelling
some properties or entities-there is always a remainder. To put
this in another way, the community is defined in opposition to
that which is excluded from it .... Thus ... the aspiration
towards civilized cohesive communities with shared values,
98
languages and aims, inevitably involves exclusion.
A presumed consent policy, by imposing a specific culture, a
culture of prolonging life, of organ transplantation, of donors and
recipients and of utilitarian fragmentation of dead bodies, would
presume and then assure its superiority over other cultures. It is
arguable that informed consent does the same, in presuming refusal
and thus imposing a framework of non-donation. The fact that there
exists a right to opt-out from the presumed organ donation system is
used as a counter-argument to accusations that presumed consent
policies attempt to impose a culture: it is only a presumption after all.
Correspondingly, one can contract-out from the informed consent
However, the comparison with
system by choosing to donate.
presumed consent does not hold up.
Under strict presumed consent, a mere right to opt-out does not
leave enough room for active and empowered decisions, as shall be
further explored in Part III. Indeed, it encourages silence as the
privileged mode of participation. Informed consent does not. Under
the soft version of presumed consent, the authority presumes consent,
and must make a qualified "reasonable effort" to verify its
presumption by searching for a dissenting voice behind the silence.
Still, the reasonable efforts to search and get to alternative voices are
preceded by a medical criterion, that is, the priority to preserve the
useful life of the organs to be harvested. Moreover, the substance of
the "reasonable efforts" requirement is unclear.
Minorities remain disadvantaged in a situation of reversible
presumption: the burden to opt-out is theirs, regardless of the
language barriers, misunderstandings and communication problems
In a multicultural
they may encounter in health care facilities.
society, the medical community should "view organ donation through
a cultural lens, using understanding and sensitivity to each ethnic
group's cultural framework and the way in which it may influence
Requests for organ
their decision about whether to donate."99

98. Squires, supra note 81, at 94-95.
99. See T. Randall, Key to Organ Donation May Be Cultural Awareness, 265 JAMA
176 (1991); see also BASHIR QURESHI, TRANSCULTURAL MEDICINE: DEALING WITH
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donation should be made in a manner that respects cultural
difference.""
One potential critique of this turn to deliberation and to
multiculturalism is the irony that encouraging debate about the issue
of post-mortem organ procurement imposes standards upon how to
address values and life-choices. Choosing deliberation as the best
mode for mobilizing values and encouraging respect for multiplicity of
values has its own normativity. There are communities in which it is
offensive to talk about issues like death, dead bodies, and opening
dead bodies. Some might prefer not to address the issues, even at the
cost of losing control over treatment of the body upon death. Some
might be so absolutely opposed to post-mortem organ donation that
simply discussing it causes them a great deal of distress. Yet, when
hospitals or organ procurement agencies do not know the decedent's
wishes, they inevitably have to open communication on the matter.
Yet the critique does not point out why presuming anything from
these people is a more justified course of action. Presumptions, at
least in the strict approach, solemnizes silence as the vehicle of
decision-making. In doing so, they also systematically repress the
multiplicity of voices on the issue. It is true though that the softer
version of presumed consent, by requiring only a "reasonable effort" to
locate objections, does not pressure those who prefer not to deliberate
about this issue to reluctantly express themselves.
The next section takes a closer look at the nature of
presumptions, and considers whether presumptions of consent are
different from mere deductions in the way they treat choices.
Following this, two paradigms for presumed consent will be
presented: tacit consent and consent by inference. The supposed
neutrality of the presumption mechanism will also be investigated.
The inequalities prevailing of status, access to speech, and capacity to
articulate consent expressly cause problems for the "neutral"
understanding of presumed consent. Presumptions apply more for
certain groups than for others.
IV. PRESUMED CONSENT: TACIT CONSENT OR CONSENT BY INFERENCE?

Tacit consent can be constructed as the mode of expression most
facilitated by presumed consent. Tacit consent can be given by silence

PATIENTS FROM DIFFERENT CULTURES (2d ed. 1994); see also RACHEL SPECTOR,
CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN HEALTH AND ILLNESS

100. See Randall, supra note 99.

(4th ed. 1996).
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or absence of positive action. Yet our society does not give a voice to
all. Therefore, silence or the absence of positive action does not have
a unique significance, and is not necessarily deliberate. Second,
silence, or absence of positive action can be considered symptoms, not
What lies behind a silence, or a "tacit
substantive responses.
consent," is not always clear.
A. Can (Tacit) Consent be Presumed?
In The Leviathan, contractarian theorist Thomas Hobbes
suggests that signs of contract and consent are either express or by
inference.'0 Hobbes therefore validates tacit consent as a standard
paradigm for consenting to contracts. Hobbes defines acts that signify
consent, either tacit or express, as distinct from acts implying
consent. An act signifying consent is a medium for a specific message,
consent. It is a sign, a signal, a representation that expresses and
transmits from one person to another the content of the message of
consent. It is distinct from an act implying consent; the latter being
more like a hint that opens the door for the deduction, the inference,
and the drawing of conclusions by the observer. Acts implying
10 2
consent are the source of John Locke's conception on tacit consent.
For Locke, consent to political and social obligations can be inferred
by the observer, regardless of the potential consentor's intentions or
even awareness that she or he is consenting. Locke's notion of tacit
consent is hypothetical, or rather, conditional, in the sense that
consent exists and binds automatically if it is given to good
government. In this sense, Locke stresses that the quality of the
government is a source for the quality of the consent towards
obligations. Following his reasoning, the fact that donating cadaveric
organs to others is good policy would of itself be a ground for
validating people's tacit consent to make such gifts. This argument
does not go on to imply that if donating cadaveric organs is good, it
justifies automatic removal regardless of people's consent. Rather,
Locke is saying that if such donations are good, there are grounds to
assume people's tacit consent to do it.
Working from this basis, A. John Simmons defines consent "by
inference," or Locke's tacit consent, and investigates why the
conception of agreement ought to be categorized differently from

101. See THOMAS HOBBES, The Leviathan, in
OF MALMESBURY (Scientia Verlagg 1966).

THE

ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES

102. See JOHN LOcKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge University Press

1960).
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express consent. 1 3 According to Simmons, if consent can be tacit, it is
not because it has a different meaning from express consent. Calling
consent tacit does not point to its lack of expression, but instead
captures its special mode of expression. Tacit consent is given and
expressed just like express consent. It is simply expressed by the
failure to do certain things. But under what conditions can silence, or
lack of action, be deemed a genuine sign of consent? According to
Simmons, it should be clear to the potential consentor that consent is
appropriate. Practically, this means that the potential consentor is
awake and aware of what is happening. Second, acceptable means of
expressing dissent must be available, and understood or made known
to the potential consentor. Third, the point at which expressions of
dissent are no longer acceptable must be obvious to the potential
consentor. These three conditions ensure that the silence signifies
tacit consent. In the sphere of political and social obligations, two
other conditions are added: fourth, the means acceptable to indicate
dissent must be reasonable and reasonably easily performed; fifth, the
consequences of dissent cannot be extremely detrimental to the
potential consentor. 104
Simmons emphasizes that silence, or failure to act, can be based
on a misunderstanding of the issues at stake or of the procedures to
express dissent. In this case, there is a breakdown in communication
among the agents, and despite appearances, the result is not tacit
Its tacit
Tacit consent is a delicate construction.
consent.
characteristics must be deliberate:
[0]nly if tacit consent is treated... as a deliberate undertaking
can the real force of consent theory be preserved. For consent
theory's account of political obligation is appealing only if consent
remains a clear ground of obligation, and if the method of consent
protects the individual from becoming politically bound
unknowingly or against his will. And it seems clear that these
essential features of a consent theory cannot be preserved if we
allow that tacit consent can be given unintentionally. 10'
Simmons' commitment to intentional consent is critical of John
Locke's interpretations of tacit consent to political and social
obligations.'1 6 Simmons finds that Locke's conception of tacit consent
widens the definition of consent to render it almost unrecognizable.
103. See ALAN JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979).

104. Id. at 80-82.
105. Id. at 83.
106. See LOCKE, supra note 102.
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Locke's notion of tacit consent is analogous to an act of
trusteeship based on an original contract, which is drafted by the
founders/fathers of the Commonwealth or the Constitution. The
terms of this contract
are not questioned or negotiated; they are self10 7
evident truths.

Where and how does consent exist in these conditions? Locke
believes that individuals are interested in certain "enjoyments"
granted by the state. Taking the state's enjoyments implies consent,
individual consent to both the enjoyments and their corollaries or
inherent costs. 0 8

In response to this claim, Simmons argues that

none of Locke's consents to enjoyments are in fact genuine consensual
acts. Social obligations that derive from such enjoyments do not
originate from the principle of consent. These obligations arise, if at
all, from other sources like gratitude or fairness. 9 For example, it
might be a fair-play obligation to provide one's organs
unintentionally, but it would not be a consensual act, or even a tacitly
consensual act.
Simmons' criticism reveals the distinction between obligationgenerating acts and consensual acts. He suggests that Locke's tacit
consent theory fails to give an honest account of social obligations.
Moreover, it demonstrates that the paradigm of choice is essential if
we are to take consent seriously enough to use it in the lexicon of
social actions. Since Simmons refers to tacit consent and at the same
time emphasizes the necessity of consent as being a "deliberate
undertaking," one wonders whether consent, even tacit, can be
presumed.
Consider the problem of presuming a deliberate, intentional
undertaking. Tacit consent, as Simmons elaborates, includes
intention and choice. Yet presumed consent has an element of
guesswork that contradicts deliberation, choice, and intent.
Presumed consent is expressed by the consentor in a special "tacit"
mode, such as silence, or an absence of positive action, which has the
same meaning as express consent. Both processes signify a deliberate
undertaking. Simmons suggests practical conditions to be met before
concluding that deliberate, tacit consent has been made."0 Therefore,

107. See SIMMONS, supra note 103; see also Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent I,
59 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 990 (1965); see also Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent II,
60 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 39 (1966).
108. See LOCKE, supra note 102.
109. See SIMMONS, supra note 103.

110. Id. at 80.
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without these concrete conditions, presumed consent becomes consent
by inference.
It may be unrealistic to posit tacit consent as deliberate intention.
Can deliberate intention be presumed, in the context of health care,
and more precisely, in the case of organ procurement? Put differently,
in the context of organ procurement, do the social, organizational, and
bureaucratic conditions allow silence to be so meaningful as to signify
agreement, so we can honestly speak about presumptions of
deliberate undertakings?
B. Presumed Consent, Dissent and Social Reality
Misinterpreting silence as tacit consent to organ donation might
be avoidable. In this scheme, opt-out procedures must fulfill their
purposes for registering dissent adequately.
Opting-out from
requirements that appear to be non-mandatory can be harder than it
should be." 1' One author has pointed out that opting-out from a
default rule of presumed consent to organ procurement is "more
illusory than real.""'
It is likely that some people will not register a dissent to organ
removal in a presumed consent system. People may prefer to
passively obey the default rule, or people may not care about the
issue. Overarchingly, most humans are disinclined towards active
protest."' In a related statistic, a great number will not register

111. According to contract law doctrine, opting-out from default rules is rarely easy.
This very observation questions the so-called fundamental difference between default
rules and mandatory. I draw this general argument from Eyal Zamir's discussion of
hierarchy of rules, including default rules that govern contract interpretation and
gap-filling. See Zamir, supra note 67.
112. Goodwin, supra note 5, at 35.
113. Admittedly, this phenomenon would occur in the same manner under an
informed consent/presumed refusal scheme. This group of people, who passively
comply with the default rule and have a bias toward status quo, whatever it is, is
generally important to consider. However, I have reasons to think that this group
might be relatively small in the case of organ procurement. Ronald Dworkin argues
that people may disagree on hard issues such as euthanasia, abortion, but that most
of them will agree on the fact that the issues are important and related to the sacred.
Arguably, organ donation is a sacred issue. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S
DOMINION (1993); see also M.A. Jacob, Femme et foetus pendant la grossesse: deux
patients et sujets de droit autonomes?, 11 R.J.E.U.L 45 (1997). Facts appear to concur
with Dworkin's point. In the research consulted, the majority of people either accept
or refuse to donate their organs after death. In many surveys, there is no category
called "indecisive" or "does not care."
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dissent because they are not aware that
they have to. They may also
114
not know how to register an objection.
In fact, silence can be interpreted as ignorance of the
presumption that everyone is assumed to want to donate his or her
organs after death and that opting-out is necessary." For example,
in the United States a survey conducted by Michelle Goodwin about
organ transplant laws revealed that only five percent of the randomly
selected respondents were aware that their state had enacted
presumed consent law.11 6 Also, in jurisdictions where a law of
presumed consent has been implemented, objection to organ donation
often requires relatively complex procedures. For example, a French
jurisdiction requires that the refusal be formulated in front of a civil
servant at a City Hall before it would be entered in the computer
database. 7 Problems could arise for those who do not understand the
jurisdiction's official languages. 8
In the same manner, people who have uncertain status as
residents; people with criminal records who may have reason to avoid
State authorities; and people who find it intimidating to solemnize
their dissent in an institutional setting would all find themselves in a
compromised position. For another example, in jurisdictions where
the opt-out must be expressed on a driving license or an identity
card,1 9 one wonders how an undocumented or homeless person would
indicate dissent. Elsewhere, a patient's opposition to organ removal
must be made
this is a hurdle for less-educated and
•. . in • writing;
120
illiterate individuals.
In Brazil, millions of workers could lose their
jobs for taking time off work during business hours to register on the
opt-out list.
People with language vulnerabilities, linguistic
minorities, as deaf-world activists call them, would also face a

114. See Robert M. Veatch & J.B. Pitt, The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical
Problems in New OrganProcurementStrategies, 27:2 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS
1888 (1995).
115. M.O.R.E. REPORT, supra note 42, at 22. See also James F. Childress, Ethical
Criteriafor Procuring and Distributing Organs for Transplantation, 14 J. HEALTH
POL. POLY. & L. 87 (1989).

116. Goodwin, supra note 5, at n.120.
117. J.Y. Nau, Tandis que le ministre de la santo prdpare une rdforme FranceTransplantpropose un registre national des opposants au don d'organes, LE MONDE,
June 12 1992.
118. See Bailey, supra note 34.
119. Such as in Brazil. Id. at 726 n.2.
120. Such as in Austria. See LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES, supra note 32.
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struggle to have their choice understood. 2 ' Overall, despite the
impression given by some governments that it is possible to opt-out,
many citizens would not: they cannot. 112 Even if they choose to opt
out, mechanical and organizational difficulties could prevent them
from lodging their choice: computer failure, loss of hard-copy
documents, and accessibility problems, to name a few.
Certainly, those who live on the margins are very likely to be left
out of the opt-out system. In some of the jurisdictions where
presumed consent is implemented, they actually are. In the U.S.,
there are concerns about the potential for an overrepresentation of
poor teens of color as organ suppliers.123
Silence is the mode of expression privileged by presumed consent.
But in light of these observations, it is hard to believe that silence is
homogeneously meaningful of a deliberate undertaking. Many "false
positives" 2 4 are likely to derive from presumed consent policy. These
difficulties suggest that the quality of "consent" prone to be
"presumed" fails in the practical task of matching choices for organ
procurement with candidacy for organ procurement. 25 This is the
foreseen path of presumed consent.
V. THE PROBLEM WITH, AND THE NEED FOR, DEFAULT RULES

Since the path to opting-out is narrow and obstructed by many
factors, the default rule might gradually become de facto
mandatory. 1 6 An uncomfortable, and challenging conclusion can be
drawn with regards to default rules. The phenomenon of "voluntary"
becoming "mandatory" is not unique to presumed consent. As a
result, opponents of presumed consent must admit that the informed
consent scheme could be subject to the same criticism. In an informed
consent scheme/presumed refusal (i.e., informed consent) those who
want to donate organs must also opt-out from the default rule by
registering (i.e., "opting-in") as organ donor.

121. See Anna-Miria Muhlke, The Right to Language and Linguistic Development:
Deafness from a Human Rights Perspective, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 705 (2000).
122. Theodore Silver uses the expression "conscription in disguise." Silver, supra note
19, at 706.
123. Goodwin, supra note 5, at 28.
124. J. Michael Dennis et al., An Evaluation of the Ethics of Presumed Consent and A
Proposal Based on Required Response, at http://www.unos.org/Resources/
bioethics.asp?index=1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
125. Id.
126. See generally Zamir, supra note 67.
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Nevertheless, it is submitted that a presumed consent scheme
creates striking social anomalies. For example, "[s]urveys show that
persons of lower education are far less likely to consent to organ
donation, yet it is precisely this group of people who would run the
highest risk of not knowing the proper procedures for opting-out of the
system.17 It is evident that almost any default rule can disadvantage

those who do not have access to the tools and mechanisms to express
their opposition. It will also almost always disadvantage those whose
personal choices are subject to authoritative social or religious
pressures. Given this premise, it is useful to take a close look at the
possible injustices to the marginal person: the homeless, the
disenfranchised, the illiterate, or a dissenting member within a tight
and homogeneous community (internal minority) who wants to donate
organs, but does not have access to a forum to express that wish. A
presumed consent default rule would work for the benefit of this
person. Query those who oppose presumed consent precisely because
its opt-out mechanism is likely not to reach all the potential
dissenters who do not wish to donate their organs after death; are
they not disturbed by the injustice of an informed consent system?
Just as with an opt-out system, information about informed consent
cannot reach all potential dissenters, and thus discriminates against
marginalized people who want to donate their organs after they die.
A. Listening to The Voiceless Wanting to Donate
It appears that in the context of consent to organ donation, any
default rule can cause harm to the most vulnerable members of
society. Is there some kind of awkward hierarchy in this harm to
those who cannot express their choices, depending on which default
rule is in force?
The principle of inviolability and integrity of the body in absence
of consent, well grounded in positive law, 12 is a possible criterion to
assist us in this "assessment." Apply positive law to the example of A
and B who are, for various reasons, left out of the organ procurement
information system. Whatever the State will do with their bodies
after they die will not be based on their wishes, but on the default
rule.
127. Veatch, supra note 114, at 1890 (referring to data from D.L. Manninen & R.
Evans, Public attitudes and behavior regarding organ donation, 253:21 JAMA 3111
(1985)). See also L. Roels et al., A Profile of People Objecting to Organ Donation in a
Country with a Presumed Consent Law: Data from The Belgian National Registry,
29:1 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1473 (1997).
128. See Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880.
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The presumed consent scheme has different results for each. In
the first case, A cherishes the idea of donating her organs. When she
dies, the presumed consent mechanism operates, and her wishes are
technically fulfilled. B, on her part, does not want to be a postmortem organ donor.
Because of presumed consent, and the
impossibility for her to opt-out, her body will be salvaged after her
death. From the perspective of bodily integrity, her situation can be
alarming. For example, imagine that B was a homeless person. Her
body was not given much attention and care (that is, no meeting of
minimal needs with respect to food, warm clothing and adequate
housing) by the State while it was functioning and alive. In other
words, her bodily integrity, while she was alive, was repeatedly
violated 129 The irony would be that the State, as soon as death
occurs, would suddenly have not only the interest but also the
presumed authority to pay close attention to B's body (e.g. the State
will perform sophisticated procedures on her body: first, to insert a
catheter through her skin, to flush her abdominal cavity with
preservation fluid and keep her organs chilled and viable for
transplants; then to slice her body and extract the wanted organs).
Supposing an informed consent scheme (or "presumed refusal") as
the default rule, another two scenarios could play out. The case of B
demonstrates someone who does not want to donate, could not express
it anywhere, and will, technically, have her wishes respected. As
mentioned, B was voiceless during her lifetime in the State, but at
least, due to the default rule, her desires are not being frustrated at
the end of her life her corporeality, arguably her last and ultimate site
of control, is left intact.
Now look back at A, who wanted to donate her organs. Since she
could not register as an organ donor, the default rule of informed
consent has unhappy consequences for her. One could argue that, at
least, her dead body was 'respected' and left intact, and that the State
did not dare salvage her body in the interest of others without
knowing her desires. However, this argument would bring little relief
to A (or to A's decedents), and does not genuinely recognize her
perspective. A profoundly wanted to give her organs. The value of
preservation of bodily integrity, while broadly shared in society, is not

129. Arguably, bodily integrity must be preserved by both positive acts and the
prevention of negative acts. The positive act of providing very minimal requirements
to live is broadly understood to be the responsibility of the State. Therefore, its
neglect is a violation of the State upon the bodily integrity of the individual who
cannot, for example, get basic health care.
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part of A's particular vision of the good as much as the importance of
giving her organs after death is.
The above shows how awkward and arduous, or even impossible,
it is to determine a hierarchy of the suffering that will be caused by
creating a default rule of organ procurement.
It shows how
impossible is the search for a lesser violation here. The argument
that informed consent preserves bodily integrity most adequately is
not convincing. It is true that informed consent has been, and will
remain, a safeguard against most medical abuses on the body.
However, a default rule of consent to organ procurement is as
imposing and exclusionary as presumed consent. One choice for all is
maladjusted in an area where individual empowerment is basic.
Organ procurement is a delicate area. To say the least, organ
procurement default rules, as they are structured and implemented
today, are problematic. Query what can be done to make default rules
less harmful, or which default rule has simpler and easier opt-out
arrangements. 3 °
B. Does A Lesser Evil Exist?
Is the best default rule one that fosters deliberation about the
issue of consent to organ procurement? Arguably, what makes a
default rule known, and easy to opt-out from, is not the rule itself, but
the institutions that will apply it. It is true that opting-out processes
are an institutional, organizational, and bureaucratic issue with
access requirements and information requirements. But it is also a
legislative policy issue. The question is thus which default rules,
pertaining to organ procurement, are more likely to be inclusive, and
to encourage deliberation and individual positioning on the issue. 131
Contract theory suggests that legislatures should sometimes
purposefully supply a default rule that contradicts what almost
everyone wants, or, what the stronger or better informed party of the
130. Other avenues were possible. One could look for the default rule that is more
likely to fit with the preference of most people; this would require elaborate empirical
research, whereas this paper is devoted to theoretical policy-analysis. Another

possibility could have been to try and find a default rule that is more likely to change
attitudes towards organ donation. This avenue involves the value-question as to what
is preferable between donation versus non-donation. Responding to this inevitably
excludes different and dissenting views, something that I particularly attempt to

avoid in this discussion.
131. I draw my argument from contract theory on the design of default rules.
Specifically, I owe the inspiration to contract theorist Christopher Riley. See
Christopher A. Riley, Designing Default Rules in Contract Law: Consent,
Conventionalismand Efficiency, 20 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 367 (2000).
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contract wants. The State's interest in doing so is the protection of
the most vulnerable party to the contract. The rationale is that a
default rule that disadvantages the stronger and better informed
party in a contract, gives this party the impetus to avoid the
application of the default rule by raising the issue and bringing it
within the scope of the contractual negotiations. The purpose of this
default rule is to force contractors to discuss the issue, and to force
them to provide an express term of their own choice.' 32 The stronger
party thus procures the most vulnerable party the opportunity to
discuss and express her interests. If the default rule were in the
interest of the better-informed party, the better-informed party would
not broach such opportunity. It would be up to the weaker party to be
informed of the default rule mechanism and to suggest an opt-out.
The analogy with organ procurement proceeds as follows. The
first premise is that the medical community is interested in
increasing organ donations as demonstrated earlier. Additionally,
deliberative ethics is as an adequate route to decision-making about
organ donation. Therefore, the second premise is that normatively,
there should be exchange of information as well as individual and
collective positioning on the issue of organ procurement. This
suggests that the organ procurement default rule shall purposefully
contradict what the most powerful party in the context, the medical
community, seeks. 13' For the State to provide a default rule that goes
against the interest of the medical community would be not to take
the shortcut of the presumed consent rule, but to implement an
informed consent rule. By doing so, the State would place upon
medics and organ procurement organizations and relatedly, upon
itself, a strong incentive to inform citizens regarding the issue covered
by the default rule, to encourage them to make a choice of their own
about it, and to support them in using opt-out mechanisms if it is
their desire by making these mechanisms more user-friendly and
accessible. These steps might help reduce the asymmetry between

132. See id. Here again, we might face the seemingly unavoidable problem of
imposing one vision, in that the rule imposes on those who do not care to make

positive decisions. But we can hardly force anyone to deliberate and choose. If those
who do not care are forced to participate, it might just give them an incentive to say
"no" to distance them from the enterprise, which does not leave them alone with their
decision not to decide.
133. This claim that the medical community is the strongest party ought to be
qualified. One should not forget that, aside from being powerful structurally and
politically, the medical community also works in collaboration with future organ

recipients, who cannot be assumed to be on the powerful side.
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the medical community and the citizen about the default rule. It
would also help to alleviate the systematic burdens to information
systems faced particularly by the marginalized.
We should
remember, as was elaborated above, that marginalized individuals'
active participation is not of great interest for a system operating with
a presumed consent regime, since their silence serves the interest in
more organs. The State knows of the interest in increasing donations,
and acknowledges the importance of deliberation to avoid exclusion
and coercion. Accordingly, it should recognize the privileged position
held by the medical community vis-h-vis possible donors, and supply a
default purposefully contrary to the interest in more organ donations.
This is not to say that an informed consent scheme is more
inclusive for those on the margins than a presumed consent one.
Problems of access to information distribution and opt-out
mechanisms can, and do, occur under both schemes. But there is
strong evidence that a commitment to deliberate and informed
consent is the scheme that best protects citizens on the margins.
Based on the rationale that the stronger party must be controlled, the
legislature has provided a model deserving application to default
consent rules. According to contract theory, the stronger party would
have to disclose information and negotiate with the donor. Although
not perfect, such a default rule would be the lesser of the evils.
C. Objections and Responses
Several objections can be raised against the above proposal.
First, the rationale that applies contract theory to default organ
procurement rules might be considered excessive.
In most
jurisdictions, the standard of informed consent to organ procurement
already applies.
It derives from the well-established, almost
universally employed, paradigm of informed consent to health care.
However, the point of this discussion was not to find a new universal
rationale for informed consent to organ procurement. Rather, the
purpose is much narrower; it is limited to examining already-enacted
presumed consent legislation, and to provide a perspective of critiques
and opposition. It is also an attempt to reinforce the commitment to
the informed consent paradigm for policy-makers tempted by theories
of presumed consent.
A presumed consent scheme maintains a high imbalance between
the medical community and the citizens about the issue of organ
procurement. In fact, within a presumed consent scheme, we query
the former's incentive in disclosing information, encouraging
deliberation and improving access to opt-out mechanism. On the
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other hand, in an informed consent scheme, medics and organ
procurement agencies are encouraged to inform citizens about the
benefits of post-mortem organ procurement and to foster discussion
about the issue.
After a closer look, one might wonder whether this course of
action might bring precisely just what critical approaches to
deliberative ethics warn against: a reductive approach to
communication as a mere attempt to convince. In this case, it could
take the form of mass information campaigns, or even worse, upon
misinformation through public relations forces, as opposed to the
cultivation
of genuine communication
about
the
issue.
Acknowledging the possibility of this risk, it is submitted that it is not
accentuated in the case of organ procurement. Other cases where
public or private bodies want to encourage certain behaviors on the
part of citizens are much more likely to obtain this result. The
transfer of information about post-mortem organ procurement, and
the settings to deliberate about it, should be crafted carefully so they
do not render consent a mere tool that can be shaped and orchestrated
by hospitals and organ procurement organizations. Behavior should
not be empowrmen
coercedand.
or colonized;.. behavior
should be the result of
134
empowerment and emancipation.
Concretely, this might mean
disclosing of the "bad news" as well as the "good news" about postmortem organ procurement. 3 5 The body will have to be cut in order to

134. This relates to the difference between strategic actions and communicative,

emancipatory exercises, as developed by Jurgen Habermas. The difference between
the latter, through which the normal process of rationalization, or change, occurs, and
the former, through which abnormal processes of change occur, is that strategic

actions, as opposed to communicative acts, colonize the life-world.
distorted communication.

JURGEN HABERMAS,

They create

THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE

ACTION (1987); see also WHITE, supra note 62; see also
This distortion occurs through

RASMUSSEN,

supra note 62.

voracious, but scarcely perceived technical demands of society's sub-

systems, such as the economy and the political administration. These...
create and orchestrate a social consensus so as to enhance the technical
efficiency of the system; but in so doing subtly undermine the idea that
consensus consists of an unforced agreement between people.
ALAN How, THE Hj'ABERMAS-GADAMER DEBATE ON THE NATURE OF THE SOCIAL: BACK TO

BEDROCK 17 (1995). This operation is done within a systematic agenda for efficiency,

that is, for science's "technical" interests.
135. Margaret Verble and Judy Worth suggest a framework for decision-making in

organ donation, which favors providing comprehensive information, and emphasizing
the importance of disclosing the bad news about organ transplantation at the risk of
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remove organs and tissues. There is a possibility that the removed
organs will not transplanted due to unforeseen medical reasons.
Despite the fact that the body will be respected and the procedures
pain-free, all information must be disclosed to potential suppliers in
any information campaign. In addition, the quality and duration of
life that can ensue from organ136 replacement should also not be overidealized like it often is today.

VI. CONCLUSION

In Organ Donation and the Chinese Community in Ontario,"7 a
medical student conducts a survey in which he finds that the issue of
consent is crucial for Chinese when it comes to cadaveric organ
procurement. The poll shows that if before her or his death, a
Chinese person has failed to sign a mandating document, their family
would be unwilling to donate their organs for transplant purposes if
asked by a physician. Perhaps the most revealing results are the
answers to the question, "do you agree that it is important for people
to tell their families whether or not they would want their organs to
be donated upon death?" A clear majority, eighty-two percent, of
Chinese respondents said that yes, that it was important for them.'38
On the other hand, discussions conducted with Chinese
physicians revealed that "the older members of the Chinese
community are frightened of Western medicine in general' ' 39 and that
"the first hurdle is to tackle awareness through advertising and then
to find out the barriers toward organ donation.' 40 In order to increase
awareness, the suggested recommendation was to educate by
providing explanation of the procedure.' 4 '
Overall, the survey
indirectly but unequivocally demonstrates the inappropriateness of
any attempt to infer without asking, to assume agreement, and to
make presumptions of consent among Chinese patients and their
families with respect to cadaveric organ procurement. The emphasis

being "less efficient." Margaret Verble & Judy Worth, Adequate Consent: Its Content
in the Donation Discussion, 8 J. OF TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 99 (1998).
136. See RENEE Fox AND JUDITH SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1992).
137. S.

MOSTOWY,

ORGAN

(M.O.R.E. Ontario 1994).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 11.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 12.

DONATION AND THE

CHINESE COMMUNITY

IN ONTARIO
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put on awareness, advertising, public health education and family
communication, indicates that questions have to be asked sensitively
in appropriate and understandable language. Answers should also be
received clearly. Only then can a transplant procedure be performed
on the deceased's body. The Chinese community highlights the
practical problems an organ procurement system would pose if the
diversity of potential donors were ignored in favour of immediate,
short-term benefits gained by institutionalized presumptions of
consent.
In a perfectly egalitarian and homogeneous society, a genuine
social contract could exist, and accordingly, all people, regardless of
race, religion, language, gender, socio-economic, and resident status
could know about and decide whether to stay in or withdraw from a
Otherwise, in a diverse and
policy of presumed consent.
heterogeneous society, presumed consent can result in the nonconsensual harvesting of organs. This has been demonstrated to be
unacceptable. Machado stresses that by increasing the possible
harvest of body parts from people who do not want to donate,
"presumed consent" may become organ expropriation. Such a status
would "potentially de-legitimi[ze] the whole procedure."142 The default
rule of non-automatic organ donation seems a better default rule, as it
leaves the burden of increasing the number of organ suppliers on the
medical community, the most powerful actor in the organ
procurement field. Informed consent refrains from taking shortcuts
that run the risk of discriminatorily disturbing cultural and religious
sensitivities about bodies and death.

142. MACHADO, supra note 1, at 193.

